Browse zlib specs (41 of 62)
ck_adler32_combine
The checksum of the whole equals adler32_combine of the checksums of its two parts, for any cut and any starting value whose halves are below 65521.
- spec
- 23 lines of C
- with its headers
- 63 lines
- status
- Proved
- 41 of 62
On this page
The spec
The spec is the C program harness/ck_adler32_combine.c, 23 lines, shown whole as it is in the repository at 37189f4. It includes harness/laws_common.h (40 lines). Its first comment states the property in full, with every bound.
// Law ck_adler32_combine: For any bytes (any length up to PTRDIFF_MAX that the allocator provides), any split of them
// into a first and a second part and any Adler-32 value to start from (both halves below 65521), adler32_combine of the
// first part's checksum (from start) and the second part's (from 1) is the checksum of all the bytes (from start).
#include "laws_common.h"
int main(void) {
size_t len = upto(PTRDIFF_MAX);
size_t split = upto(len);
unsigned char *buf = alloc_any_bytes(len);
if (buf == NULL)
return 0;
uLong high = upto(65520);
uLong start = high << 16 | upto(65520);
uLong first = adler32_z(start, buf, split);
uLong second = adler32_z(1, buf + split, len - split);
uLong whole = adler32_z(start, buf, len);
// zlib.h, adler32_combine: "adler32_combine() returns the Adler-32 checksum of seq1 and seq2 concatenated,
// requiring only adler1, adler2, and len2."
gp_assert(adler32_combine(first, second, (z_off_t) (len - split)) == whole);
return 0;
}harness/laws_common.h, 40 lines
// laws_common.h: trivial helpers shared by the zlib laws (each law includes it once). No models, no algorithms.
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "quickproof.h"
#include "zlib.h"
static size_t upto(size_t max) {
size_t value = nondet_size();
return value < max ? value : max;
}
static uInt clip(size_t n) { return n < UINT_MAX ? (uInt) n : UINT_MAX; }
static unsigned char *alloc_any_bytes(size_t n) {
unsigned char *bytes = malloc(n);
if (bytes != NULL)
nondet_bytes(bytes, n);
return bytes;
}
static unsigned char *copy_of(const unsigned char *source, size_t n) {
unsigned char *copy = malloc(n);
for (size_t i = 0; copy != NULL && i < n; i++)
copy[i] = source[i];
return copy;
}
static int bytes_eq(const unsigned char *a, const unsigned char *b, size_t n) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++)
if (a[i] != b[i])
return 0;
return 1;
}
static void set_buffer(z_stream *strm, unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, unsigned char *out, size_t out_len) {
strm->next_in = in;
strm->avail_in = (uInt) in_len;
strm->next_out = out;
strm->avail_out = (uInt) out_len;
}
static void new_stream(z_stream *strm) {
strm->zalloc = Z_NULL;
strm->zfree = Z_NULL;
strm->opaque = Z_NULL;
set_buffer(strm, Z_NULL, 0, Z_NULL, 0);
}The theorem
QuickProof generated this statement from the spec, in src/contracts/ck_adler32_combine.v:
Theorem ck_adler32_combine : harness_safe whole_prog.src/contracts/laws.v states it on the spec's own program, whole_prog (the spec linked with the code under test), with its proof:
Theorem ck_adler32_combine : harness_safe Zlib.contracts.ck_adler32_combine.whole_prog.
Proof. exact (proj1 (proj2 (proj2 (proj2 (proj2 (proj2 (proj2 (proj2 (proj2 (proj2 (proj2 (proj2 Zlib.contracts.suite.suite)))))))))))). Qed.Read as a statement about runs, it says that no run of the program has undefined behaviour or a failing check, for every value the spec can draw. That reading rests on VST's adequacy theorem, which is not yet instantiated in Rocq (formerly Coq) for QuickProof's environment.
The C files (units) its program links
adler32.c
What it leaves out
- What the first comment of the spec excludes, and its bounds.
- Like every spec of this proof: termination (a run that never returns is not a counterexample), and binaries built by a compiler (the theorem is about the code as CompCert defines C for x86_64, LP64), one thread.
- Where zlib reports
Z_MEM_ERROR, most specs end the run and claim nothing about it; the first comment of the spec says so. - The edits to zlib's code, listed in the repository, are tested, not proved.
The summary page says what the proof as a whole covers.
How it was proved
AI agents wrote the proof, and Rocq checks it. qp verify passes on this repository: this statement is the one generated from the spec at the contract commit, and its proof uses only Rocq's standard axioms and VST's abstract malloc library.