Browse WireGuard specs (8 of 38)
Proofs / WireGuard / The handshake
hs_reject_response
A consume_response that fails, on any 92 bytes and after A's initiation, leaves A's peer for B as it was: every field of its handshake, its three keypair slots and its reference count.
- spec
- 41 lines of C
- with its headers
- 149 lines
- status
- Proved
- 8 of 38
On this page
The spec
The spec is the C program harness/hs_reject_response.c, 41 lines, shown whole as it is in the repository at 3c1fc13. It includes harness/hs_unchanged.h (45 lines) and harness/hs_laws.h (63 lines). Its first comment states the property in full, with every bound.
// Law hs_reject_response: For devices A and B with any private keys and any preshared key, any clocks (boot clock
// below 2^62 ns) and any randomness, after A's wg_noise_handshake_create_initiation for B, with A's handshake state
// field then set to any 32-bit value or left as it is, a wg_noise_handshake_consume_response on A of any 92 bytes
// that fails (returns NULL) leaves every field of A's handshake with B, its keypair slots and its reference count as
// they were. Besides any bytes, the message may carry A's sender index, or be B's genuine response to the initiation,
// so that runs reach every check.
#include "hs_unchanged.h"
int main(void) {
// Choose the inputs: the devices and their keys, any clocks, A's initiation
struct pair p;
new_pair(&p);
any_clocks();
struct message_handshake_initiation initiation;
bool initiated = wg_noise_handshake_create_initiation(&initiation, &p.a_peer.handshake);
// Any message: any bytes, or with A's index, or B's response
struct message_handshake_response message;
message.header.type = nondet_u32();
message.sender_index = nondet_u32();
message.receiver_index = nondet_u32();
nondet_bytes(message.unencrypted_ephemeral, sizeof message.unencrypted_ephemeral);
nondet_bytes(message.encrypted_nothing, sizeof message.encrypted_nothing);
nondet_bytes(message.macs.mac1, sizeof message.macs.mac1);
nondet_bytes(message.macs.mac2, sizeof message.macs.mac2);
if (initiated && (nondet_u8() & 1))
message.receiver_index = initiation.sender_index;
if (initiated && (nondet_u8() & 1) && wg_noise_handshake_consume_initiation(&initiation, &p.b) != NULL)
(void) wg_noise_handshake_create_response(&message, &p.b_peer.handshake);
// A's handshake state: any, or as the initiation left it
if (nondet_u8() & 1)
p.a_peer.handshake.state = (enum noise_handshake_state) nondet_u32();
struct wg_peer before;
copy_peer(&before, &p.a_peer);
// Consume. WireGuard paper, 5.1: "Several classes of attacks are avoided by not allowing unauthenticated packets
// to influence any state"; Noise, 5.3, ReadMessage: "aborting if any DecryptAndHash() call returns an error".
struct wg_peer *found = wg_noise_handshake_consume_response(&message, &p.a);
// Check
if (found == NULL)
gp_assert(same_peer(&p.a_peer, &before) != 0);
return 0;
}harness/hs_unchanged.h, 45 lines
// hs_unchanged.h: hs_laws.h, and a field-by-field copy and comparison of a peer's state, for the laws that say a
// call changes nothing (hs_reject_*). No models, no algorithms.
#include "hs_laws.h"
static void copy_peer(struct wg_peer *to, const struct wg_peer *from) { // every handshake field, keypairs, references
const struct noise_handshake *h = &from->handshake;
to->handshake.entry.peer = h->entry.peer;
to->handshake.entry.next = h->entry.next;
to->handshake.entry.hashed = h->entry.hashed;
to->handshake.entry.type = h->entry.type;
to->handshake.entry.index = h->entry.index;
to->handshake.static_identity = h->static_identity;
to->handshake.state = h->state;
to->handshake.last_initiation_consumption = h->last_initiation_consumption;
to->handshake.remote_index = h->remote_index;
for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
to->handshake.ephemeral_private[i] = h->ephemeral_private[i];
to->handshake.remote_static[i] = h->remote_static[i];
to->handshake.remote_ephemeral[i] = h->remote_ephemeral[i];
to->handshake.precomputed_static_static[i] = h->precomputed_static_static[i];
to->handshake.preshared_key[i] = h->preshared_key[i];
to->handshake.hash[i] = h->hash[i];
to->handshake.chaining_key[i] = h->chaining_key[i];
if (i < 12)
to->handshake.latest_timestamp[i] = h->latest_timestamp[i];
}
to->keypairs.current_keypair = from->keypairs.current_keypair;
to->keypairs.previous_keypair = from->keypairs.previous_keypair;
to->keypairs.next_keypair = from->keypairs.next_keypair;
to->refcount.refcount = from->refcount.refcount;
}
static int same_peer(const struct wg_peer *p, const struct wg_peer *q) { // what copy_peer copies is equal
const struct noise_handshake *a = &p->handshake, *b = &q->handshake;
return a->entry.peer == b->entry.peer && a->entry.next == b->entry.next && a->entry.hashed == b->entry.hashed &&
a->entry.type == b->entry.type && a->entry.index == b->entry.index &&
a->static_identity == b->static_identity && a->state == b->state && a->remote_index == b->remote_index &&
a->last_initiation_consumption == b->last_initiation_consumption &&
bytes_eq(a->ephemeral_private, b->ephemeral_private, 32) && bytes_eq(a->remote_static, b->remote_static, 32) &&
bytes_eq(a->remote_ephemeral, b->remote_ephemeral, 32) && bytes_eq(a->hash, b->hash, 32) &&
bytes_eq(a->precomputed_static_static, b->precomputed_static_static, 32) &&
bytes_eq(a->preshared_key, b->preshared_key, 32) && bytes_eq(a->chaining_key, b->chaining_key, 32) &&
bytes_eq(a->latest_timestamp, b->latest_timestamp, 12) &&
p->keypairs.current_keypair == q->keypairs.current_keypair &&
p->keypairs.previous_keypair == q->keypairs.previous_keypair &&
p->keypairs.next_keypair == q->keypairs.next_keypair && p->refcount.refcount == q->refcount.refcount;
}harness/hs_laws.h, 63 lines
// hs_laws.h: helpers shared by the handshake laws (hs_*): two devices with a peer for each other, set up as the
// kernel sets them up, and any clocks. No models, no algorithms.
#include "quickproof.h"
#include "noise.h"
#include "peer.h"
#include "device.h"
extern u64 wg_shim_boottime_ns; // the shim's clocks (patch/wg_shim.c): the laws set them
extern s64 wg_shim_real_sec;
extern long wg_shim_real_nsec;
extern unsigned long wg_shim_allocs; // the shim's count of successful kzalloc calls
static u64 any_u64(void) { // any 64-bit value
u64 high = nondet_u32();
return high << 32 | nondet_u32();
}
static int bytes_eq(const u8 *a, const u8 *b, size_t n) { // a[0..n-1] == b[0..n-1]
for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++)
if (a[i] != b[i])
return 0;
return 1;
}
static void any_clocks(void) { // any boot clock below 2^62 ns, any real-time clock
wg_shim_boottime_ns = any_u64() >> 2;
wg_shim_real_sec = (s64) any_u64();
wg_shim_real_nsec = (long) (nondet_u32() % 1000000000u);
}
static void new_device(struct wg_device *wg, struct index_hashtable *indices, struct pubkey_hashtable *keys,
const u8 private_key[32]) { // device.c (kzalloc'd), its private key set as netlink.c sets it
wg->index_hashtable = indices;
wg->peer_hashtable = keys;
indices->head = NULL;
keys->head = NULL;
for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; i++)
wg->static_identity.static_public[i] = 0;
wg_noise_set_static_identity_private_key(&wg->static_identity, private_key);
}
static void new_peer(struct wg_peer *peer, struct wg_device *wg, const u8 public_key[32], const u8 psk[32]) {
peer->device = wg; // peer.c, wg_peer_create: one reference, no keypairs, a new
peer->is_dead = false; // handshake, listed in the device's public-key table
peer->keypairs.current_keypair = NULL;
peer->keypairs.previous_keypair = NULL;
peer->keypairs.next_keypair = NULL;
peer->refcount.refcount = 1;
wg_noise_handshake_init(&peer->handshake, &wg->static_identity, public_key, psk, peer);
peer->pubkey_next = wg->peer_hashtable->head;
wg->peer_hashtable->head = peer;
}
struct pair { // devices A and B, each with a peer for the other
struct wg_device a, b;
struct index_hashtable a_indices, b_indices;
struct pubkey_hashtable a_keys, b_keys;
struct wg_peer a_peer, b_peer; // a_peer: A's peer for B; b_peer: B's peer for A
};
static void new_pair(struct pair *p) { // any private keys, any preshared key (the same on both sides)
u8 a_private[32], b_private[32], psk[32];
nondet_bytes(a_private, 32);
nondet_bytes(b_private, 32);
nondet_bytes(psk, 32);
wg_noise_init();
new_device(&p->a, &p->a_indices, &p->a_keys, a_private);
new_device(&p->b, &p->b_indices, &p->b_keys, b_private);
new_peer(&p->a_peer, &p->a, p->b.static_identity.static_public, psk);
new_peer(&p->b_peer, &p->b, p->a.static_identity.static_public, psk);
}The theorem
QuickProof generated this statement from the spec, in src/contracts/hs_reject_response.v:
Theorem hs_reject_response : harness_safe whole_prog.src/contracts/laws.v states it on the spec's own program, whole_prog (the spec linked with the code under test), with its proof:
Theorem hs_reject_response : harness_safe WgNoise.contracts.hs_reject_response.whole_prog.
Proof. exact (proj1 (proj2 (proj2 (proj2 (proj2 (proj2 (proj2 (proj2 (proj2 (proj2 WgNoise.contracts.suite.suite)))))))))). Qed.Read as a statement about runs, it says that no run of the program has undefined behaviour or a failing check, for every value the spec can draw. That reading rests on VST's adequacy theorem, which is not yet instantiated in Rocq (formerly Coq) for QuickProof's environment.
The C files (units) its program links
drivers/net/wireguard/noise.clib/crypto/blake2s.clib/crypto/chacha.clib/crypto/chacha-block-generic.clib/crypto/poly1305.clib/crypto/poly1305-donna32.clib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.clib/crypto/curve25519.clib/crypto/curve25519-fiat32.cpatch/wg_shim.cquickproof/libc/libc.c
What it leaves out
- What the first comment of the spec excludes, and its bounds.
- Like every spec of this proof: runs of more than one thread (the locks and RCU are those of one thread), termination (a run that never returns is not a counterexample), and binaries built by a compiler (the theorem is about the code as CompCert defines C for 64-bit x86).
- The kernel around the code is a shim of plain C for one thread, and the code carries rewrites of idioms that VST cannot handle. Both are tested against the kernel's code, not proved.
The summary page says what the proof as a whole covers.
How it was proved
AI agents wrote the proof, and Rocq checks it. qp verify passes on this repository: this statement is the one generated from the spec at the contract commit, and its proof uses only Rocq's standard axioms and VST's abstract malloc library.